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Abstract
The principle of compositionality requires that the meaning of a complex expression
remains the same after substitution of synonymous expressions. Alleged counterexam-
ples to compositionality seem to force a theoretical choice: either apparent synonyms
are not synonyms or synonyms do not syntactically occur where they appear to
occur. Some theorists have instead looked to Frege’s doctrine of “reference shift”
according to which the meaning of an expression is sensitive to its linguistic context.
This doctrine is alleged to retain the relevant claims about synonymy and substi-
tution while respecting the compositionality principle. Thus, Salmon (Philos Rev
115(4):415, 2006) and Glanzberg and King (Philosophers’ Imprint 20(2):1–29, 2020)
offer occurrence-based accounts of variable binding, and Pagin and Westerståhl (Lin-
guist Philos 33(5):381–415, 2010c) argue that an occurrence-based semantics delivers
a compositional account of quotation.Our thesis is this: the occurrence-based strategies
resolve the apparent failures of substitutivity in the same general way as the standard
expression-based semantics do. So it is a myth that a Frege-inspired occurrence-based
semantics affords a genuine alternative strategy.
Keywords Compositionality · Semantic values · Linguistic context · Reference
shift · Frege · Occurrences · Quotation · Variable binding
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The principle of compositionality is a cornerstone of contemporary formal semantics.
A semantic theory is compositional for a language when the meaning of a complex
expression is determined by the meanings of the simpler expressions from which it is
syntactically derived. Minimally, this requires that the meaning of a complex remains
the same after substituting synonymous expressions while leaving all else the same.
That is:
compositionality: If φβ differs from φα only by substitution of β for α, and β
and α are synonymous, then φα and φβ are synonymous.
Semanticists have been largely successful in assimilating problematic cases into com-
positional semantic theories (see, e.g., Portner and Partee 2008).
Yet, certain recalcitrant cases remain, e.g. variable or pronoun binding, quotation,
attitude reports, etc. In these cases, we appear to have non-synonymous expressions
φ and ψ that differ only by the substitution of synonymous expressions α and β.
Proponents of compositional semantics are faced with a standard diet of options in
response to these apparent violations of the principle of compositionality.
deny synonymy: While the complex expressions φ and ψ do differ only by the
substitution of α and β, and perhaps there is some dimension of meaning along
which α and β are synonymous, there is actually another dimension of meaning
according to which α and β are not synonymous.
deny substitution: While α and β are synonymous, and perhaps it appears
that φ and ψ are syntactically related by the mere substitution of α and β, the
expressions φ and ψ do not actually differ only by the substitution of α and β.
Somefind that this strict diet does not satisfy. The apparent counterexamples to compo-
sitionality force a theoretical choice: either the apparent synonyms are not synonyms
or the synonyms do not syntactically occur where they appear to occur. Those with
wider tastes look to an earlier tradition stemming from Gottlob Frege for dealing with
apparent counter-examples to the compositionality of what he called Bedeutung, or
reference.
According to Frege, “the truth value of a sentence remains unchanged when an
expression is replaced by another having the same reference” (Frege 1892/1952: 64).
But Frege observed that apparently co-referential terms such as ‘the capital of Scot-
land’ and ‘Edinburgh’ do not substitute salva veritate into various linguistic contexts.
Standard examples include (i) quotation contexts, (ii) propositional attitude ascrip-
tions, and (iii) modal contexts. The sentences in the pairs (1), (2), and (3) differ by the
substitution of ‘the capital of Scotland’ for ‘Edinburgh’, but the first sentence in each
pair may be true while the second sentence in each pair may be false.
(1) ‘Edinburgh’ begins with the fifth letter of the English alphabet.
‘The capital of Scotland’ begins with the fifth letter of the English alphabet.
(2) Pierre said that Edinburgh is beautiful.
Pierre said that the capital of Scotland is beautiful.1
1 Pierre may believe that the capital of Scotland is Glasgow.
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(3) Edinburgh might not be Edinburgh.
The capital of Scotland might not be Edinburgh.
Frege proposed a radical response. Though the expressions co-refer, they may also
“shift” their reference in embedded contexts. In the case of quotation:
…a word standing between quotation marks must not be taken as having its
ordinary reference. (Frege 1892/1952: 58–59)
In the case of propositional attitude ascriptions such as reported indirect speech or
modals, the reference is the customary sense or cognitive significance of the embedded
expression.
In reported speech, words are used indirectly or have their indirect reference.We
distinguish accordingly the customary from the indirect reference of a words;
and its customary sense from its indirect sense. The indirect reference of a word
is accordingly its customary sense. (Frege 1892/1952: 59)
So according to Frege, the referent of an expression is sensitive to the linguistic envi-
ronment it is embedded in. Occurrences of the expressions ‘Edinburgh’ and ‘the capital
of Scotland’ co-refer when they are unembedded. But, the expressions acquire differ-
ent referents when they are embedded in quotation, propositional attitude ascriptions,
or modal contexts.2
Some have seen in Frege’s remarks, a doctrine of occurrence-based semantics
which provides an attractive alternative to the standard diet of options.3 According
to this doctrine, an expression has meaning through its occurrences. And different
occurrences of the same expression type may differ in meaning. An occurrence of
an expression in a complex expression is an expression type paired with a “linguistic
context” in the complex expression,where a linguistic context is essentially a particular
position within the syntactic structure.4
It is thought that this doctrine can retain the relevant instances of synonymy but
relativized to an occurrence: unembedded occurrences of ‘Edinburgh’ and ‘the capital
2 Frege’s 1879 theory of identity in Begriffsschrift could also be understood as an occurrence-based view
(as an anonymous referee suggested). For example when Frege says “[signs] suddenly display their own
selves as soon as they are combined by the sign for identity” (Frege 1879/1967: §8), this sounds highly
reminiscent ofwhat Frege later says about quotational contexts in Frege (1892/1952). See a recent discussion
and reconstruction of Frege’s early view of identity in Pardey and Wehmeier (2019).
3 In addition toFrege’s doctrine of indirect referenceSalmon (2006) also relates occurrence-based semantics
to Frege’s infamous context principle. Yet, the context principle is primarily put to use in the Grundlagen
in relation to the “contextual definition” of number, and not as a general principle guiding the semantics of
indirect contexts.
4 Pagin and Westerståhl gloss the basic idea as follows: “take a well-formed complex term s[u] and knock
out the constituent u. What remains, s[. . . ] is the linguistic context of that occurrence of u in s[u], the
environment of the argument place” (Pagin and Westerståhl 2010c: 394). They formally model this as a
sequence of derivation rules encoding the path in the derivation tree that starts from the root and ends with
the relevant node (Pagin andWesterståhl 2010c, §4.2). There are various choices for formally modelling lin-
guistic context depending on the specific syntactic framework, but since our key point is general, we needn’t
make a strong commitment. For further discussion of linguistic contexts (and occurrences of expressions
therein) see Pagin and Westerståhl (2010a: §3.8), Glanzberg and King (2020: 15–19), and Salmon (2006:
416–20).
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of Scotland’ may be genuinely synonymous. But the meaning of these expressions
systematically shifts when they are embedded in various linguistic contexts. Because
the meaning of an expression is relativized to a linguistic context, proponents of
occurrence-based semanticsmust reformulate an occurrence-relative compositionality
principle such as the following.5
occurrence- based compositionality: If φβ differs from φα only by substi-
tution of β for α in linguistic context c, and β and α are synonymous in c, then φα
and φβ are synonymous (in an unembedded context).
It is thought that this alternative compositionality principle provides a systematic
enough foundation for semantics, and avoids the choice forced by the strict diet of stan-
dard semantics. Proponents of occurrence-based semantics promise liberation from
the constraints of standard semantics. Thus, Glanzberg and King (2020) defend a
classical picture, whereby the semantic value of a sentence is a proposition, against a
threat from the compositional semantics of binding—they do so by positing various
meaning adjustments that are “triggered by syntactic environments”. Salmon (2006),
similarly, offers an occurrence-based alternative for variable-binding, which promises
to avoid unpalatable consequences of the standard approaches. And Pagin and West-
erståhl (2010c) argue that—in contrast to the standard semantics—occurrence-based
semantics delivers a compositional (in the occurrence-based sense) and straightfor-
ward account of quotation allowing for cases of synonymous expressions embedded
in not-synonymous quotational constructions.
But, unfortunately, occurrence-based semantics does not deliver the results it
advertises. We will argue that full articulation of the theoretical commitments of
occurrence-based semantics demonstrates that the approach does not present a gen-
uine alternative to the standard diet of options. In fact, it collapses into one of the
the standard strategies for resolving apparent violations of compositionality; deny
synonymy or deny substitution.
In Sect. 1, we examine how to best develop Frege’s observations into a system-
atic occurrence-based semantics. In Sect. 2, we examine Pagin and Westerståhl’s
occurrence-based semantics as developed in their theory of quotation, arguing that
it collapses into one of the standard responses and thus does not meet their own
desiderata. In Sect. 3, we show that the occurrence-based semantics for variable bind-
ing in first-order logic developed in Salmon (2006) is not a genuine alternative, and
that for similar reasons, the type-adjusting approach provided by Glanzberg and King
(2020) for the semantics of natural language binding also collapses into one of the
standard options. We conclude with a methodological lesson.6
5 The principle of occurrence-based compositionality is essentially an informal statement of what Pagin
and Westerståhl define as LC-Subst(μ,C) (2010a: 400), and if rendered substitutionally Glanzberg and
King’s Strong Type Adjusting Compositionality is getting at the same idea (Glanzberg and King 2020: 18).
See also Salmon (2006: 430) and Pagin and Westerståhl (2010a: 260).
6 The lessons here apply more generally to the “switcher semantics” developed in, e.g., of Pagin and Glüer
(2006), Pagin (2019), and Packalén (2016).
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1 Fregean reference shifts and occurrence-based semantics
Above,we described three pairs (1), (2), and (3)which differmerely by the substitution
of the co-referential terms ‘the capital of Scotland’ and ‘Edinburgh’. The first sentence
in each pair may be true while the second, false. Frege explained substitution failures
of these types by arguing that the particular uses (in the relevant sentences) of ‘the
capital of Scotland’ and ‘Edinburgh’, in fact, have different referents. The customary
referents of ‘the capital of Scotland’ and ‘Edinburgh’ are the same city. But as they
occur embedded under quotation marks, propositional attitude ascriptions, and modal
operators, respectively, Frege thinks that these expressions have distinct referents.
Consider again the pair (1):
(1) ‘Edinburgh’ begins with the fifth letter of the English alphabet.
‘The capital of Scotland’ begins with the fifth letter of the English alphabet.
According to Frege, the uses of ‘the capital of Scotland’ and ‘Edinburgh’ in (1) refer
to themselves, and thus such uses are not co-referential. Frege tells an analogous story
about propositional attitude and modal contexts, whereby in such contexts words refer
to their customary senses. In thiswayFrege insists that an expression can have different
referents in its different occurrences in different linguistic contexts.
Proponents of occurrence-based semantics believe this Fregean idea can be imple-
mented so as to expand our standard diet of options concerning apparent failures of
compositionality. We believe otherwise. Following Kaplan (1964: 22–23) we distin-
guish two methods for implementing Frege’s proposal.7 There are those employing
the method of direct discourse and those employing the method of indirect discourse.
The method of direct discourse uses distinct expressions in the formalism in order to
explain apparent substitution failures such as (1). The method of indirect discourse
uses the same expression, but offers more complicated semantic rules which allow
the expression to make different truth conditional contributions in its different occur-
rences, to explain the substitution failures (Kaplan 1964: 27–28). Properly articulating
each approach requires some care. But doing so reveals that neither approach expands
the standard diet of options.
1.1 Themethod of direct discourse
The method of direct discourse corresponds to an utterly banal way in which an
expression might have different meanings in different linguistic contexts and thereby
lead to substitution failures. The expression ‘bank’ might be used as a synonym for
‘financial institution’. But now consider the fact that the first sentence of the pair (4)
may be true while the second sentence is false. Thus, (4) is an apparent violation of
the principle of compositionality.
(4) I parked my boat on the bank.
I parked my boat on the financial institution.
In particular, the first sentence may be true without the second sentence being true
because ‘bank’ may be used to mean something other than financial institution, viz.
7 See also the discussion in Klement (2002: chapter 4).
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the land that lines the river. That is, ‘bank’ is ambiguous. It has two meanings. In a
properly regimented language, it would be regimented by two different expressions.
On the relevant readings of the sentences in (4), they do not differ by the substitution
of synonymous expressions. So, the sentences in (4) are not a genuine violation of the
principle of compositionality.
The method of direct discourse explains the differences in truth-value of the sen-
tences in the pairs (1), (2), and (3) just aswe have explained the difference in truth-value
of the sentences in (4). According to Kaplan, “[t]his then is Frege’s treatment of inter-
mediate contexts—obliquity indicates ambiguity” (Kaplan 1968: 184). To analyse the
ambiguity, we introduce distinct symbols with different meanings, just as we might
differentiate the two uses of ‘bank’ by writing a subscript, e.g. ‘bank1’ and ‘bank2’.
As Kaplan (1968: 184) says, Frege’s approach has the effect of “indicating (some
would say, postulating) ambiguities where others have seen only opacity.” Positing
ambiguity when faced with an apparent compositionality failure is, of course, among
our standard options, namely deny substitution. Thus this would seem to foreclose
the possibility of a novel occurrence-based semantics arising from Frege’s insight. If
occurrence-based semantics is meant to provide a genuine alternative to the standard
diet of options, it can’t be derived from this interpretation of the Fregean approach.8
Some of Frege’s own remarks in a letter to Russell do suggest the method of direct
discourse.
To avoid ambiguity, we ought really to have special signs in indirect speech,
though their connection with the corresponding signs in direct speech should be
easy to recognize. (Frege 1902/1980: 153)
Because he treats a word such as ‘Edinburgh’ as referring to different things depending
on whether it is embedded, Frege sees the word as ambiguous across these uses.
The ambiguity is to be resolved in our formalism by introducing different symbols
corresponding to each use.9
But a subtle reading of this passage raises questions about Frege’s intent. Having
observed that Frege suggests that the terms embedded in indirect speech and those in
direct speech should have a connection, Kripke (2008: 190) asks “are they independent
symbolic expressions or are they not?” Kripke continues:
And of course though ‘London’ primarily refers to a great city in England, it
is also the name of a city in Ontario (Canada), and for all I know other cities.
[…] According to Kaplan, Frege’s theory of direct and indirect quotation …is
that the ambiguity in these contexts is similar. In direct and indirect quotation
contexts phrases do not have their usual denotation. So far so good, and no
8 See Goodman and Lederman (2020) for a recent discussion and criticism of Frege’s ambiguity strategy.
And see Pickel and Rabern (2019) for a reply.
9 Frege doesn’t actually implement this idea (nor any other way of treating indirect contexts) into his
official formalism, but in the letter to Russell he uses the device of underlining to distinguish customary
and indirect reference. Church’s formalization of Frege explicitly adopts the method of direct discourse,
where he uses subscripts to disambiguate (see his Logic of Sense and Denotation in Church 1951). See
also Introduction to Mathematical Logic where Church speaks of “eliminating the oblique uses of names
by introducing special names to denote the senses which other names express” (Church 1956: 8). See also
Klement (2002: chapter 4).
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doubt this is Frege’s theory. [footnote 29] But it is significant that these are not
ordinary ambiguities or unusual references unlike …the ‘London’ example. For
in Frege’s theory of indirect quotation and the like, the unusual references are
determined entirely from the context. In the other examples the unusual reference
can often be guessed from the context, but it is not determined by any semantic
rule. (Kripke 2008: 189–90)
Thus according to Kripke, Frege’s theory should not be assimilated to ordinary
ambiguity—instead it should be understood as something more systematic and rule-
governed. Those who are inclined to emphasize this difference between ordinary
ambiguities and Fregean “reference shift”must develop a semanticswhich can system-
atically predict the shifty behaviour of an expression across various linguistic contexts.
1.2 Themethod of indirect discourse
If the Fregean doctrine of “reference shift” points to something more subtle and sys-
tematic, how should it be understood? The method of indirect discourse points the
way forward. Rather than semantically analyzing the different contributions of an
expression in its different occurrences by introducing two expressions which univo-
cally make these different contributions, the method of indirect discourse complicates
the semantics for the single expression.
A heavy handed way of complicating the semantics would be to introduce differ-
ent interpretation functions that are operative for different occurrences. Consider, for
example, the occurrences of ‘Edinburgh’ in (5) and (6).
(5) ‘Edinburgh’ refers to Edinburgh.
(6) “Edinburgh” refers to ‘Edinburgh’.
One would like to say that ‘Edinburgh’ occurs four times in these two sentences: once
unquoted, twice in single quotes, and once in double quotes. Onemight introduce three
interpretation functions: .$ which is operative in unquoted contexts, .£ which is
operative in single quoted contexts, and .e which is operative in double quoted con-
texts. On such a view, the single expression ‘Edinburgh’ can make three different truth
conditional contributions in its different occurrences. It can contribute Edinburgh$,
which is a city; or Edinburgh£, which is a name of a city, or , which
is the quote name of the name of a city.
One might hope that this sort of approach—which seems to make good on Frege’s
claim that uses of names under (single) quotation marks contribute themselves—
provides the promising occurrence-based alternative to the standard diet of options.
But we deny that it provides such an alternative. In particular, insofar as the approach
explains substitution failures, it does so by denying that the substituted expressions
are synonymous.
To see this consider the fact that standard cases of ambiguity such as ‘bank’ can also
be treated using different interpretation functions. So, rather than introducing distinct
expressions to explain the ambiguity in ‘bank’, the method of indirect discourse would
introduce two interpretation functions .R and .F. Each interpretation function gives
a disambiguation of ‘bank’, where bankF is a financial institution but bankR is the
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lining of a river. Now consider again the apparent substitution failure in (4). Insofar as
the sentences ‘I parked my boat on the bank’ and ‘I parked my boat on the financial
institution’ differ in truth-value, it is because they are being evaluated with respect to
the interpretation function .R.
I parked my boat on the bankR = I parked my boat on the financial institutionR
But this interpretation function distinguishes these two sentences only because it yields
different meanings for the parts. Namely, bankR = financial institutionR. Thus,
insofar as the sentences in (4) differ in truth-value, they do so because their components
differ in meaning.
The comparison with ambiguity brings out another problem. As formulated thus
far, the variation in meanings is bound to strike one as unsystematic. It is not gov-
erned by semantic rules. There doesn’t seem to be any interesting relation between
interpretations such as .$, which is operative in unquoted contexts, and .£, which
is operative in single quoted contexts. This brings the same sorts of ills as ambiguity.
For instance, without some sort of systematic relation among the meaning functions,
one will seemingly have to learn them separately just as one learns the different lexical
entries corresponding to ‘bank’ separately. The fact that these different meaning func-
tions apply in different linguistic contexts doesn’t help distinguish this treatment from
an ambiguity analysis, since the different lexical entries corresponding to an ambigu-
ous word such as ‘can’ will be determined by whether it occurs as a common noun or
modal verb. The problem is exacerbated when one reflects upon the fact that quotation
is recursive: one can always quote a quoted expression. So we need infinitely many
interpretation functions, one for each level of quotation embedding. (Similar remarks
may apply to analogous treatments of variable binding and attitude embeddings.)
Instead onewants to say that each expression is governed by a single semantical rule
that allows it to make different truth conditional contributions in different linguistic
contexts. The method of indirect discourse requires articulating this semantic rule for
an expression. For example, on such an approach, the expression ‘Edinburgh’ is gov-
erned by a single linguistic rule determining that the expression refers to Edinburgh
while unembedded and to the expression itself when embedded in a single quota-
tion marks. On this implementation of the method of indirect discourse, the meaning
of ‘Edinburgh’ has then been intensionalized. Rather than being a city, the meaning
of ‘Edinburgh’ is given by a function from linguistic contexts to its values in these
contexts. That is, the meaning of an expression will be given by a single interpreta-
tion function .. Given an expression such as ‘Edinburgh’, the meaning Edinburgh
will itself be a function from linguistic contexts into occurrence meanings. In cer-
tain linguistic contexts c, Edinburgh(c) will be a city. But in another context c∗,
Edinburgh(c∗) will be the expression ‘Edinburgh’.
This version of the method of indirect discourse does not expand the options for
responding to substitution failures either. The failure of ‘Edinburgh’ and ‘the capital
of Scotland’ to substitute in (1) would be explained by the fact that these expressions
themselves have different meanings. It is therefore an application of deny syn-
onymy.
123
The myth of occurrence-based semantics
1.3 Occurrence-based semantics
Advocates of occurrence-based semantics nevertheless insist that Frege’s remarks
point the way to a novel solution to problems of substitution. They do so by insisting
that occurrences—expressions in linguistic contexts—are the fundamental bearers of
meaning. One way to implement this would be to frame the semantic axioms using a
two-placed interpretation function (Pagin and Westerståhl 2010c). The function takes
both an expression and a linguistic context as arguments and outputs an occurrence
meaning.
.: (expressions × linguistic contexts) −→ occurence meanings
An expression such as ‘Edinburgh’ will have a single lexical entry which for any
linguistic context c assigns a meaning to that expression in context.
Advocates of occurrence-based semantics insist that this approach carries an impor-
tant pay-off. There is no such thing as the semantic value of ‘Edinburgh’, Edinburgh,
or the semantic value of ‘the capital of Scotland’, the capital of Scotland. There
are only the meanings of these expressions at some particular linguistic context c:
Edinburghc and the capital of Scotlandc. ‘Edinburgh’ and ‘the capital of Scotland’
are synonymous as they occur in contexts such as ‘Edinburgh is rainy’ and ‘the capital
of Scotland is rainy’, but not in the context of quotation such as those in (1).
This approach is underspecified at a crucial point: what—if anything—is the seman-
tic value of an expression type. On one view, each expression-context pair has its own
lexical entry. On this view, ‘Edinburgh’ as it occurs in ‘Edinburgh is the capital of
Scotland’ has a different lexical entry from ‘Edinburgh’ as it occurs in “‘Edinburgh’
begins with the fifth letter of the English alphabet”. On the alternative view, these
various meanings in context are subsumed under a more general lexical entry for the
expression type. On this view, there is a single semantic value for ‘Edinburgh’ that
determines its occurrence meanings across the various contexts.
Unfortunately for the occurrence-based semanticist, neither option—viewing the
meanings of expressions in context as basic or as subsumed under a larger semantics
for expression types—expands the range of possible replies to puzzles arising from
substitution. Taking each expression in context to have its own semantic axiom is
implausibly unsystematic. It again raises the spectre of ambiguity. On the other hand,
taking the various occurrence meanings to follow from the meaning of the expression
itself simply intensionalizes the meaning and therefore is a version of deny syn-
onymy.
In what follows we will examine occurrence-based responses to two substitution
puzzles. These responses purport to be outside of the standard diet options. However,
we show that once the proposals are made precise they fall in line with options from
the standard diet. That is, they are ultimately variants of deny substitution or deny
synonymy.
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2 Pure quotation
As we have intimated, a kind of stress test for compositionality is the problematic case
of quotation—what happens when language is turned upon itself? Assume that the
name ‘Edinburgh’ occurs as a syntactic constituent of this sentence (the one you are
currently reading), as the orthography suggests. Thus, the application of quotemarks is
a genuine syntactic operation—that is, a quote phrase is a complex expression derived
from applying quotes to an expression.10 Let’s represent an expression α embedded
under quotes in the object language as follows: quote α. Quoted expressions refer to
expressions and thus the semantics should yield the following:
quote Edinburgh = ‘Edinburgh’
quote the capital of Scotland = ‘the capital of Scotland’
The problem with compositionality is that ‘Edinburgh’ and ‘the capital of Scot-
land’ co-refer, that is Edinburgh = the capital of Scotland. By the principle
of compositionality, if two expressions such as ‘quote Edinburgh’ and ‘quote the
capital of Scotland’ differ only by the substitution of synonymous terms, then
the complex expressions themselves are synonymous. It would follow that quote
Edinburgh = quote The capital of Scotland, which is false.
The problem here is not simply due to the assumption that the semantic value
of a name or definite description is its referent, the problem generalizes. Take any
distinct but synonymous expressions α and β. By assumption the expressions have
the same semantic value, α = β, but since they are distinct expressions their
quotations must differ in value: quote α = quote β. Yet by compositionality,
quote α = quote β, since these expressions differ only by the substitution of
synonyms. Thus, if quotation is a genuine syntactic operation, and there are distinct
but synonymous expression types in the language, then quotation is not compositional.
The obvious thing to do at this point is call into question some of the assumptions that
lead to the failure of compositionality.
The standard diet of options provides two choices: deny synonymy or deny
substitution. To deny deny synonymy one would deny that the purported dimen-
sion of meaning whereby α = β exhausts the meaning of α and β—there is a
richer notion of meaning according to which α and β differ. But since this claim will
have to be generalized for any pair of simple expressions α and β this amounts to
claiming that there are no two lexically distinct (quotable) expressions α and β which
have the same meaning. Thus, the semantic theory will be compositional but only
trivially so—the antecedent of compositionality is false for any distinct α and β.
Due to the absurdly fine-grained meanings such a strategymust posit and the result-
ing trivialization of compositionality a more popular approach traditionally has been
to deny that quotation is a syntactic operation, in others words deny that the word
‘Edinburgh’ occurs as a syntactic constituent of the following sentence:
‘Edinburgh’ begins with the fifth letter of the English alphabet.
10 The key assumption here is that there is a syntactic rule which when applied to an expression α yields the
quote name of α. So alternatively we could talk about the derivation rule quote and the result of applying
the rule to an expression quote(α). Compositionality is threatened, since it requires a rule that maps the
semantic value of α to the semantic value of quote(α).
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In terms of our standard diet this strategy is to deny substitution. This type of view
has been endorsed in one form or another by many theorists, e.g. it was endorsed by
Tarski (1936/1956) (cf. Quine 1940: 26), when he said that expressions surrounded
by quotes
…may be treated like single words of a language, and thus like syntactically
simple expressions. The single constituents of these names—the quotationmarks
and the expressions standing between them—fulfil the same function as letters
and complexes of successive letters in single words. Hence they can possess no
independent meaning. (Tarski 1936/1956: 159)
While a popular view, theorists have been dissatisfied with the idea that quotations are
syntactically simple expressions, e.g. Davidson complains as follows:
If quotations are structureless singular terms, then there is no more significance
to the category of quotation mark names than to the category of names that begin
and end with the letter ‘a’ (‘Atlanta’, ‘Alabama’, ‘Alta’, ‘Athena’, etc.). On this
view, there is no relation, beyond an accident of spelling, between an expression
and the quotation mark name of that expression. (Davidson 1979: 30)
It seems that an approach which accounts for the non-accidental nature of these con-
nections would be preferable.11
As we have said, Pagin and Westerståhl promise that occurrence-based semantics
provides an attractive alternative. In particular, they argue one can offer what they call
a “straightforward” semantics for quotation without having to deny substitution
or deny synonymy. They call these desiderata (a) and (b), respectively.12
A straightforward account of (the use of quote marks in) pure quotation is one
which (a) takes the quoted phrase to be a syntactic constituent of the quoting
phrase (the quoted phrase surrounded by quote marks), and (b) allows at least
one case of two syntactically distinct and quotable expressions having the same
semantic interpretation (meaning). (Pagin and Westerståhl 2010c: 382)
Pagin and Westerståhl (2010b) reformulate the interpretation relation . “so that it
takes a context type as additional argument, where we have one default context type
for ordinary use, and a distinct one for quotation, and similarly for the semantic
operations” (2010b: 275).13
11 Davidson famously put forward his own alternative, which agrees that ‘Edinburgh’ does not occur as a
syntactic constituent of “ ‘Edinburgh”’, whereby quotation marks are demonstratives (roughly equivalent to
‘that expression’): “The singular term is the quotation marks, which may be read ‘the expression a token of
which is here’ […] the inscription inside does not refer to anything at all, nor is it part of any expression that
does. Rather it is the quotation marks that do all the referring, and they help to refer to a shape by pointing
out something that has it.” (Davidson 1979: 90). Note that one could agree with Davidson that quotation
marks are demonstratives (‘the expression which is my syntactic sister’) and insist that the expression
‘Edinburgh’ occurs as a syntactic sister to the quotes. This contextualist account is worth considering. But
we don’t take any official stand on the syntax and semantics of quotation in this paper, since our aim is
more metatheoretical. For discussion of the various issues involved see Cappelen and Lepore (2007).
12 Pagin andWesterståhl explain that “(b) is the very weak requirement that one’s notion of meaning allows
some non-trivial synonymies” (2010c: 382, footnote 1).
13 In Pagin andWesterståhl (2010b), they develop a related proposal which makes use of multiple interpre-
tation functions, a simple version of which we rejected in §1.2. But Pagin and Westerståhl (2010c) develop
the proposal further, making use of the strategy of relativizing . to context types.
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Pagin and Westerståhl model a linguistic context as a sequence of derivation rules
encoding the path in the derivation tree that starts from the root and ends with the
relevant node. So, for example, consider these three expressions:
(i) Edinburgh
(ii) ‘Edinburgh’
(iii) “ ‘ Edinburgh’ ”
In (i)–(iii) the name ‘Edinburgh’ occurs in three different linguistic contexts. Where
quote is the derivation rule for pure quotation it first occurs in (i) unquoted, the null
context 〈〉, and then in (ii) quoted in the context 〈quote〉, and finally in (iii) it occurs
in quotes within quotes, so the context 〈〈quote〉, 〈quote〉〉. According to Pagin and
Westerståhl’s occurrence-based approach the three occurrences of ‘Edinburgh’ each
have a different semantic value. The occurrence in 〈〉 has a city as its value, the
occurrence in 〈quote〉 has the name of a city as its value, and the occurrence in
〈〈quote〉, 〈quote〉〉 has the name of a name of a city as its value.
Since here we are only concerned with quotational linguistic contexts we will
model 〈〉, 〈quote〉, 〈〈quote〉, 〈quote〉〉, etc., as 0, 1, 2, . . . , respectively. So to present
their proposal, let a number n ≥ 0 indicate that an expression is embedded under n-
many quotation operators. The relativized notion of compositionality says that each
expression is assigned a meaning, in a linguistic context, and that the meaning of
a complex expression (in context) is a function of the meanings of its constituents
in their respective contexts. One may allow that two unquoted expressions agree in
meaning, for instance that Edinburgh0 = the capital of Scotland0, while denying
that enclosing them in quotes results in expressions that agree in meaning, quote
Edinburgh0 = quote the capital of Scotland0. The reason is that a name inquotations
must be evaluated in a different linguistic context from the name unquoted.14 So it
is possible that quote Edinburgh0 = quote the capital of Scotland0, because the
embedded expressions ‘Edinburgh’ and ‘the capital of Scotland’ must be evaluated at
a different linguistic context. They are evaluated relative to the linguistic context of
embedding under single quotation marks, modelled as 1. And, Edinburgh1 =  the
capital of Scotland1.
Pagin and Westerståhl advertise their view as a weakening of the principle of com-
positionality which implements Frege’s occurrence-based semantics.
…allowing for linguistic context dependence…we can obtain a semantics which
is compositional in the generalized sense […] The new semantics…will be very
close to adapting Frege’s view in Frege 1892 that quotation provides a context
in which expressions refer to themselves. (Pagin and Westerståhl 2010b: 275)
Since compositionality applies at the level of occurrences, Pagin and Westerståhl
(2010c) say that they can deliver a “straightforward” account of quotation that does
not deny substitution or deny synonymy, but which is nonetheless systematic.
We take this to mean that even if two expressions α and β have the same meanings
14 As Pagin andWesterståhl (2010c: 397) say: “The firstmain idea for an extension of a semantic framework
to handle linguistic context dependence is that when a semantic function is applied to a term s, the value
depends on the relevant context type. The second main idea is that the context type of an immediate subterm
of a term s may be different from the context type of s itself.”
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in contexts with no quotation marks and these very expressions may occur inside of
quotation marks, the result of encasing them in single quotation marks need not yield
expressions with the same meaning.
This account treats the interpretation function, ., as a two-placed relation that
takes an expression and a linguistic context to yield a meaning. A prima facie reading
of their view would have Pagin and Westerståhl (2010c) saying that the expressions
‘Edinburgh’ and ‘the capital of Scotland’ simply do not have meanings, only their
occurrences do. On this prima facie reading, there is no single semantic axiom giving
the meaning of an expression such as ‘Edinburgh’ in all contexts. Rather, there are a
sequence of functions that give an expression various meanings: .0, .1, .2 . . . We
have Edinburgh0 = the capital of Scotland0 but Edinburgh1 = the capital of
Scotland1.
Pagin andWesterståhl (2010c: 386) insist that it is possible to deliver an occurrence-
based compositional account of quotation in which (a) expressions genuinely occur
inside of quotations and (b) there are nontrivial synonyms.15 Unfortunately, while this
naive reading of their account is compositional it is not straightforward since it does
not respect clause (b). That is, it does not allow at least one case of two syntactically
distinct and quotable expressions (expressions!) to have the same meaning. Given
this, the account is not a genuine alternative to the standard diet of options, since the
proposal collapses into deny synonymy, and in fact it ends up denying that there
are any synonymous expression pairs whatsoever.
The deeper problem is that this prima facie reading simply revisits the ambiguity
approach considered above in §1.2. There we considered approaches that introduce
multiple interpretation functions .$, .£, and to explain substitution failures.
The problem with these approaches was that interpretation functions would have to
be individually learned rather than subsumed under a general semantic axiom giving
the meaning of the expression. This prima facie reading of Pagin and Westerståhl
(2010c)—on which the various interpretation functions .0, .1, .2…are not sub-
sumed under a single semantic axiom—suffers the same ills. The various meanings of
an expression such as ‘Edinburgh’ are connected only by the fact that they are assigned
to the word ‘Edinburgh’ just as the various meanings of ‘bank’ are connected only by
being assigned to the word ‘bank’.16
As before, what is wanted is a single semantic rule assigning a meaning to an
expression such as ‘Edinburgh’ all at once, in all different linguistic contexts. But this
single semantic rule would allow us to reconstruct a notion of expression meaning.
The general rule would assign the expression an occurrence meaning relative to a
linguistic context. That is, one can understand a novel sentence by understanding
the expressions it contains and, in particular, by knowing how their meanings vary in
15 “Our claim in this paper is that with a corresponding notion of linguistic context, the straightforward
account of quotation can be made compositional, in the general, contextual sense.” (Pagin and Westerståhl
2010c: 386).
16 Pagin and Westerståhl (2010c) contrast their own view with the expressions-in-context (or ambiguity)
approach (see their appendix 1). They insist: “While there are good reasons to let the lexicon distinguish
two or more meanings of bank, for example, there are no good reasons why the lexicon should care
about quotation” (409). They insist that their account has a single meaning assignment μ that evaluates an
expression t in a context c, whereas the alternative ambiguity account has disparate lexical entries, which
are not governed by a systematic rule.
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linguistic context. Adapting Fregean terminology,Dummett calls this general semantic
feature of an expression its one common sense.
The sense of a word cannot vary from context to context, but is a property of
the word itself apart from any context: for it is by knowing the sense of the
constituent words, independently of their occurrence in this sentence, that we
understand the sentence. If the sense of a word varied from context to context,
thiswould have to be according to some general rule, if wewere to understand the
sentence in which it occurs: and then this general rule would in reality constitute
the one common sense which the word possessed. (Dummett 1973: 268)
Synonymous expressions, then, would agree in Dummettian sense.
Effectively, facts about expression synonymy can be extracted from facts about
expression-in-context synonymy by requiring that synonymous expressions are syn-
onymous at every context. This common semantic value of the expression—equivalent
to curry(.) which we write as .∗—is a function which takes a linguistic context
and outputs the meaning of occurrences of the expression in the context.
.∗: expressions −→ (linguistic contexts −→ occurrence meanings)
But understood this way the approach does not differ from the standard diet of options.
The two-place function . may determine that expressions such as ‘Edinburgh’ and
‘the capital of Scotland’ have the same meaning at one linguistic context, but different
meanings at another linguistic context. This is simply because the expressions have
semantic values, respectively Edinburgh∗ and the capital of Scotland∗, that differ
tout court. But as an account of substitution failure, this amounts to deny synonymy,
the meaning of an expression at a linguistic context does not exhaust its semantic
contribution.
Indeed, Pagin and Westerståhl (2010c: 400) do reconstruct a notion of synonymy
in exactly these terms, which they call “total synonymy”. Two expressions exhibit
total synonymy just in case they are synonymous in every context. This is just to say
that two expressions α and β are totally synonymous when α∗ = β∗. But then
it follows that there are no distinct, but totally synonymous expressions! Pagin and
Westerståhl admit just this when they say
if there is a quotation context type in E , then there will be no non-trivial total
synonymy pairs: a term s is totally synonymous only with itself. (Pagin and
Westerståhl 2010c: 400)
So Pagin and Westerståhl agree that their view allows a definition of expression syn-
onymy which entails that there are no (non-trivial) total synonyms. This undermines
their desiderata for a “straightforward” account of quotation: there is not “at least one
case of two syntactically distinct and quotable expressions having the same semantic
interpretation”.
Pagin and Westerståhl (2010c: 399–400) do offer weaker notions of expression
synonymy. One notion designated synonymy stipulates a designated linguistic context,
say 0, andholds that two expressions are “synonymous” just in case α0 = β0.17 But
17 The other notion, use synonymy, requires that the two expressions mean the same in any non-quotation
context, which again is context 0 in our model.
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this seems to simply stipulate that quotation calls for special treatment. In our minds,
this undermines the point of the exercise. If all that is wanted is that the expressions
agree semantically in the unquoted contexts, then the view could be implemented even
by someone who has a notion of meaning assigned by the interpretation .∗. Even
though ‘Edinburgh’ and ‘the capital of Scotland’ disagree in meaning in the absolute
sense, Edinburgh∗ = the capital of Scotland∗, they agree in meaning relative to
unquoted contexts. That is, Edinburgh∗(0) = the capital of Scotland∗(0).
Consider an analogous position. In Kaplan’s (1989a) logic of demonstratives, the
meaning of an expression is its character, a function from extralinguistic contexts to
contents. Thus, the meaning of the first person pronoun ‘I’ is the agent of the context.
On this view, ‘I’ has a different meaning from any proper name, since proper names
have the same content in every context. However, one might put forward the view that
the first person pronoun ‘I’ and one’s own name exhibit designated synonymy, since
they agree in content whenever one utters them. Does this show that there is a deep
semantic connection between the first person pronoun and one’s name? We think not.
Rather, we take the example to illustrate that the notion of designated synonymy is
not significant for the theory of meaning.
The general lesson here is that in order to account for the unified behaviour of an
expression—our ability to understand diverse sentences that contain it, the expression
must be assigned semantic properties by the semantic theory. In the occurrence-based
approaches, the relevant semantic properties of an expression are that it has various
meanings in various linguistic contexts. But then it will be natural to ask whether
two expressions are synonymous or not. If the expressions can occur in the same
linguistic contexts and yet differ in value in some of those contexts, then they cannot
be synonymous.Occurrence-based semantics, so construed, is not a genuine alternative
to the standard options for diagnosing failures in compositionality.
3 Variable binding
Variable binding is another salient stress test for compositionality. The worry begins
with the thought that a free variable contributes an object relative to an assignment. So
two variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ might have the same semantic value relative to an assignment
σ : xσ = yσ . It would follow that the variable contributes that object to sentences
containing it, when assessed relative to the same assignment. Consider the pair (7).
(7) (a) x = x
(b) x = y
Assuming that xσ = yσ , it follows that (7a)σ = (7b)σ . But the result of
substituting ‘x’ for ‘y’ or (7a) for (7b) does not always result in a sentence with the
same truth-value relative to assignment σ . For example, consider the following:
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(8) (a) ∃x x = x
(b) ∃x x = y
(8a) and (8b) differ by the substitution of ‘x’ for ‘y’ and of (7a) for (7b). Nonetheless,
(8a) is false on any assignment, but (8b) is true on any assignment (provided there are at
least two things). So (8a)σ = (8b)σ . Thus, in this case ‘x’ and ‘y’ are synonymous
(in the relevant sense) and (8b) is the result of substituting ‘y’ for ‘x’ in (8a), but the
complex expressions (8a) and (8b) are not synonymous (in the relevant sense). For
these reasons Soames (2011) says bluntly: “Compositionality even fails for Tarskian
quantification” (129). This apparent compositionality failure threatens foundational
presuppositions of formal semantics.
The standard diet of options applies to this case as well. The deny synonymy
strategy insists that even though xσ = yσ , the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ are not fully
synonymous, since their semantic values are more fine-grained. In particular, the
expressions are taken to have as their semantic values functions from assignments
into objects: x = λσ.σ (x) and y = λσ.σ (y). As a result, x = y. In this way
one can provide a compositional semantics for quantification.18
The other prominent strategy is to deny substitution. This strategy insists that
the complex expressions ‘∃x x = x’ and ‘∃x x = y’ don’t in fact differ by the
substitution of (the synonymous) expressions ‘x’ and ‘y’. One traditional version
of this strategy would outright deny that the variables are constituents of the quan-
tified formulae. For example, on Frege’s view “variables” are simply typographic
parts of the disconnected quantifier sign serving only to link the quantifier to the
open spaces in predicates.19 For Frege variables are not expressions of the formal
language, and thus talk of variables having sense or being synonymous is simply
incoherent.20
But one need not go so far. In particular one might think that variables are genuine
syntactic units and that ‘x’ and ‘y’ might be synonymous, but nevertheless deny
substitution. On this proposal, the synonymous expressions written as ‘x’ and ‘y’
in ‘x = y’ must be distinguished from the expressions with the same shape which
occur embedded in ‘∃x x = x’ and ‘∃x x = y’. To put the matter another way,
a mark such as ‘x’ is ambiguous. The mark corresponds to distinct lexical entries.
As Salmon (2006) characterizes this position, “the lower-case letter ‘x’ (qua variable)
ambiguously represents two distinct expressions: ‘x’-bound and ‘x’-free.”21 So on this
account the formulae ‘∃x x = x’ and ‘∃x x = y’ do not differ by the substitution of
18 See Janssen (1997) and so-called cylindrifiedmodels. See also Lewis (1970), andmore recent discussion
in Rabern (2012, 2013) and Yli-Vakkuri (2013).
19 According to Frege, a quantifier sign ‘∃y . . . y . . .’ is saturated by a predicate ‘∀x x = . . .’ to form the
quantified expression ‘∃y∀x x = y’ (see Frege 1893/2013: §8). Likewise, for the Bourbaki collective who
would render a formula such as ‘∃x(Fx ∧ Gx)’ as a variable-less structure consisting of symbols, gaps,
and wires connecting symbols to gaps (see Bourbaki 1954).
20 See Wehmeier (2018) and Pickel and Rabern (2016) for discussion.
21 Salmon does not endorse this position, instead he attributes it to Jason Stanley.
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synonymous expressions (namely, ‘x’-free and ‘y’-free), but rather by the substitution
of their non-synonymous homonyms (‘x’-bound and ‘y’-bound).22
Thus, given the standard options one may deny synonymy: the semantic values
of the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ and of the sentences (7a) for (7b) are in fact distinct (even
though they agree on assignment σ ). Or, one may deny substitution: (8a) and (8b)
do not differ by the substitution of synonyms. Faced with this choice some cast about
for a further alternative in occurrence-based semantics. We now turn to examining
the occurrence-based approaches developed in Salmon (2006) and Glanzberg and
King (2020). We argue that neither present a genuine alternative. (Note that a careful
reading of Salmon suggests that he would not disagree with this conclusion, whereas
Glanzberg and King require their approach to not collapse into a standard approach
given their theoretical motives.)
3.1 Salmon’s theory of bondage
Salmon (2006) self-consciously develops an occurrence-based semantics for variables
in the tradition of Frege.
In developing an occurrence-based semantics of variable-binding, I take my cue
from Frege’s theory of indirect (oblique, ungerade) contexts. […] Quantifiers
are variable-binding operators. Like ‘believes that’, variable-binding operators
induce the variables they bind to undergo semantic shift, but a shift of a different
sort from intensional or “indirect” (oblique) operators. (Salmon 2006: 420–421)
To outline Salmon’s picture we will follow his terminology and speak of an expres-
sion’s “designatum” instead of its meanings or semantic value, but nothing turns on
this. Salmon distinguishes the designatum of an occurrence of an expression (at an
assignment) unembedded under a variable-binder from the designatum of an occur-
rence of an expression embedded under a variable-binder (at an assignment).23 Thus
Salmon distinguishes the designatum of a free occurrence of a variable from the des-
ignatum of a bound occurrence of a variable.
In response to the apparent compositionality failure above, Salmon insists on the
following: The free occurrences of variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ in (7b) designate the same
individual relative toσ . But in (8b), the occurrences of the variables under the quantifier
take on designata distinct from their free designata (and also from each other). That
is why (8b) has a different designatum from (8a).
Salmon provides a systematic, rule-governed theory about the designata of a vari-
able in its different occurrences. For Salmon, the basic semantics relativizes an
expression to a linguistic context, which Salmon models as a sequence of variables
corresponding to the sequence of quantifiers the expression is embedded under. Let-
ting β be a variable, the designatum of β when unembedded (modelled as the empty
22 Kaplan (1989a: 489–490) explicitly adopts this view for free and bound pronouns of natural language.
Kaplan (1989b) also states that “pronouns are lexically ambiguous, having both an anaphoric and a demon-
strative use” (572).
23 Here we will only focus on occurrences of variables, in particular, even though Salmon’s theory applies
to all expressions generally (both simple and complex).
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sequence ∅) relative to an assignment σ is the value of the function σ as applied to
the variable.
β∅,σ = σ(β)
So the free occurrences of variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ might have the same designatum under
some assignment σ . When a variable β is embedded under some variable-binding
operator, such as the quantifier ‘∃α’, the variable shifts its designatum. Relative to the
context of being embedded under a binder indexed with the variable α, the variable
β designates a function that takes an individual i and outputs the value of a free
occurrence of β at an assignment that differs from σ at most by assigning i to α.
βα,σ = λi .β∅,σ [α/i],
As a result, the occurrences of ‘x’ and ‘y’ embedded under the quantifier in (8b) desig-
nate λi .σ [x/i](x) and λi .σ [x/i](y), respectively. The former is the identity function
λi .i , while the latter is the constant function which takes a member of the domain an
outputs σ(y). These are different functions, so relative toσ and the linguistic context of
being embedded under ‘∃x’, the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ have different designata. Salmon
generalizes this treatment to a variable embedded under n-quantifiers (modelled as a
sequence of n variables).24
So far so good. This account is in working order. However, those looking to Salmon
for an alternative to the standard diet of responses to apparent compositionality failures
will be disappointed. Given that there is a linguistic context where distinct variables ‘x’
and ‘y’ have distinct designata, it follows that ‘x’ and ‘y’ have distinct (total) semantic
values. So, much like the discussion in the previous section, this approach collapses
into deny synonymy. For the record, we do not think of our stance as a challenge to
anything Salmon says. Salmon himself says that the various meanings assigned by the
occurrence-based semantics are in fact semantic values of the expressions themselves.
The two approaches [occurrence-based and expression-based], though differ-
ent, are not intrinsically in conflict. […] Frege’s occurrence-based semantics
in fact assigns semantic values both to expressions and their occurrences, even
while honoring hisContext Principle.His notions of customary designatum, indi-
rect sense, doubly indirect designatum, and the like, are semantic values of the
expression itself. The customary designatum is the designatum of the expres-
sion’s occurrences in “customary” settings, that is, its occurrences that are in
extensional position and not within the scope of a variable-binding operator.
(Salmon 2006: 432)
Thus for Salmon the semantic value of an expression seems to be the function that
takes a linguistic context c and outputs its designatum in c. Then the result is in accord
with our conclusion that the expressions ‘x’ and ‘y’ have different semantic values.
So the proposal ultimately denies that these expressions are synonymous and thereby
does not expand on the standard diet of responses.25
24 The recursive clause for the designata of a variable’s occurrences, following (Salmon 2006: 427) may
be stated as: β〈α1,...,αn ,αn+1〉,σ = λi .β〈α1,...,αn 〉,σ [αn+1/i].
25 Given this onmight think that the Salmon-style semantics—with its relativization to linguistic contexts—
is unnecessarily complicated. If the concern is simply to provide a compositional treatment of the language
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3.2 Glanzberg and King on type adjusting
Glanzberg and King (2020) are concerned to defend a traditional account of the rela-
tionship between compositional semantics and the objects of assertion and belief—in
primarily natural as opposed to formal languages.26 The worry they are addressing
starts from the observation that natural language contains expressions of the same
syntactic type as complete sentences that can be non-vacuously embedded under
quantifiers.27 Consider the fact that according to many approaches to natural lan-
guage syntax, any sentence which contains a quantifier in its direct object position
such as (9) has an underlying L F where the quantifier has moved outside the scope
of the sentence but leaves a co-indexed trace as in (10).
(9) John saw everyone.
(10) Everyone1 [John saw t1]
The structure (10) contains two immediate constituent expressions ‘Everyone1’ and
the “open sentence” (11).
(11) John saw t1
Following the standard semantics of Heim and Kratzer (1998), Glanzberg and King
relativize the semantic value of this open sentence to an assignment (à la Tarski). In
particular, the semantic value of (11) relative to an assignment σ will be the proposition
that John saw σ1 (though in their presentation they simplify and treat this as a truth-
value).
But this treatment raises obvious compositionality difficulties, because two open
sentences may express the same proposition relative to an assignment, yet embed
differently in larger quantified constructions. Contrast (11) with (12).
(12) John saw t2.
These two open sentences express the same proposition relative to any assignment σ
for which σ1 = σ2. But if the proposition expressed by a sentence is its compositional
Footnote 25 continued
of first-order logic, then why not just resort to the relatively simpler strategy of raising all the semantic
types to be assignment sensitive (e.g. let x = λσ.σ (x) and y = λσ.σ (y))? We agree, but take it that
Salmon is motivated by issues that are separable from compositional semantics per se. Salmon seems pri-
marily concerned with the semantic content of an expression (or occurrence thereof)—in the sense of its
corresponding constituent in a structured proposition—and thinks that “occurrence-based semantics illu-
minates”, since it “upholds intuitions about what is actually mentioned” (Salmon 2006: 418). In particular,
Salmon is concerned with the contribution a bound occurrence of a variable in a sentence makes to the
proposition expressed by the sentence. Any such account must eventually confront the antimony of the
variable, see Fine (2003). Salmon (2006: 426 footnote 14) sketches his solution in terms of his bondage
semantics; see also the related solution in Pickel and Rabern (2016).
26 This recent work builds in certain ways on King (2003) and Glanzberg (2011). See also Cappelen and
Hawthorne (2009); Schaffer (2018).
27 The problem here is an instance of the more general problem that sentences embed under various shifty
operators and thus require semantic values that are richer than propositions (Lewis 1980). See Ninan (2010)
and Rabern (2012, 2017) for elaboration. See also literature on so-called “operator arguments”, e.g., Fritz
et al. (2019).
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semantic value, then expressions differing by the substitution of (11) for (12) should
have the same semantic values at assignment σ . But these expressions do not embed
the same way under a quantifier such as ‘Everyone1’.
(10) Everyone1 [John saw t1]
(13) Everyone1 [John saw t2]
(10) is true at σ just in case John saw everyone, but (13) is true at σ just in case John
saw σ2. So they do not have the same semantic values at σ . (There is an obvious worry
here that ‘Everyone1 [John saw t2]’ does not result from movement in any natural
language sentence. We use this example to simplify a point which could be made by
contrasting ‘Everyone1 [Someone2 [t1 saw t2]]’ and ‘Everyone1 [Someone2 [t2 saw
t1]]’, which may result from movement in the natural language sentences ‘everyone
saw someone’ and ‘someone saw everyone’, respectively.28)
The standard diet of responses are obviously available here. One might deny
synonymy by holding that the expressions (11) and (12) are not genuinely syn-
onymous. On this approach, the meaning of an open sentence is given by the function
it determines from assignments to propositions. Two sentences are synonymous if
they determine the same function. Alternatively, one might deny substitution, by
arguing that (11) does not occur in (10). The latter option would be a direct challenge
to natural language syntax. So Glanzberg and King offer the hope for a third way,
which at a certain level of abstraction resembles Salmon’s theory of binding consid-
ered above. Glanzberg and King insist that occurrence-based semantics has the virtue
of retaining the classical view on the relationship between semantic value and content.
Glanzberg and King aim to vindicate the thought that unembedded sentences (11)
and (12) have the same semantic values at σ . So they endorse John saw t1σ = John
saw t2σ . Moreover, they endorse some version of the thesis that the meaning of a
complex expression at an assignment is a function of the meanings of the expressions
from which it derives at that assignment. So they need to explain how it is possible
that Everyone1 [John saw t1]σ = Everyone1 [John saw t2]σ .
Their explanation appeals to “type adjusting”. In particular, they treat the indexed
quantifier ‘Everyone1’ as looking to combine with a predicate value, a function from
term meanings to sentence meanings. When embedded under such an operator, they
insist that a sentence shifts its meaning to a “type adjusted meaning”. In particular,
the type adjusted meaning of a sentence γ at assignment σ when embedded under a
quantifier numerically indexed byα is the functionwhich takes an individual i from the
domain and outputs the value of γ assessed at the assignment σ [α/i], which assigns
i to the numerical index α.
Appealing to this type shifting rule allows Glanzberg and King to retain the basic
thought that the semantic value of a complex expression at an assignment is a function
of the semantic values of its syntactic components at that very same assignment. The
trick is that the various occurrences of an expressionmay have distinct semantic values
(even when assessed relative to the same assignment). The relevant semantic values
28 One could also make a similar point by appealing to cases with bound pronouns (instead of traces), e.g.
‘every man thinks that he is clever’, but this raises further issues concerning how to treat free and bound
pronouns that we wish to avoid here. See Rabern (2013) and Yli-Vakkuri (2013) for arguments along these
lines.
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for the principle of compositionality are their “type adjusted meanings” and not their
“normal meanings”. So in the context of ‘Everyone1 [John saw t1]’, the type adjusted
meaning of ‘John saw t1’ relative to σ is λi .John saw t1σ [1/i]. By way of contrast, in
the context of ‘Everyone1 [John saw t2]’, the type adjusted meaning of ‘John saw t2’
relative to σ is λi .John saw t2σ [1/i]. As a result, the type adjusted meanings of (11)
and (12) are distinct at σ and so make different contributions as they occur in (10) and
(13).29
So for Glanzberg and King, the “type adjusted semantic values” of a sentence
embedded under a quantifier with index α at assignment σ will be a function that
takes an object i and outputs the sentence’s unembedded semantic value at σ [α/i].
This corresponds exactly to the shifted semantic value of as sentence embedded under
a single quantifier posited by Salmon, which we discussed above. So we purportedly
have a single univocal expression which takes on different semantic values relative to
σ depending on its linguistic context.
Does this proposal expand the standard diet of options? Recall from our discussion
above that even an occurrence-based semantics must have a notion of expression
synonymy, whereby two expressions are synonymous when they share meanings in
their various occurrences. In the context of Glanzberg and King, two sentences would
be synonymous only if for any index α and assignment σ , embedding them under
a quantifier indexed by α produces the same type adjusted meaning relative to σ .
Glanzberg and King seem to agree.
…type adjustedmeanings of expressions should be defined up from themeanings
originally assigned to those expressions, which in our case will be the semantic
values of these expressions, relative to parameters. We should be able to get
the type adjusted meanings from the meanings assigned by our semantic theory.
(Glanzberg and King 2020: 17)
Clearly, the type adjusted meaning of an expression at an assignment σ such as (11) is
not a function of its unembedded semantic value at σ , since the unembedded semantic
value of (11) at σ is the same as the unembedded semantic value of (12) at σ , but their
type adjusted meanings differ.
Noting this, Glanzberg and King observe that the expression meaning assigned to
(11) cannot be its semantic value at σ . Rather, they say:30
…[W]e should really think of [an expression] γ as having a family of mean-
ings relative to σ corresponding to different choices of what gets assigned to
[numerical index] α. As a result, we cannot think of γ σ for a specific choice
of σ as capturing the meaning of γ in the intuitive sense. For of course, it may
be that γ σ = ψσ even though for another choice of assignment function
σ ∗: γ σ ∗ = ψσ ∗ and γ and ψ intuitively mean different things (‘α skis’ vs.
‘α surfs’). Hence, it is only the family of meanings that in any intuitive sense
captures the meaning of γ . […] we need more than the meaning assigned to γ
by our meaning assignment (= γ σ ). In the case of [type adjusted meanings
29 That is, λi .John saw t1σ [1/i] = λi .John saw t2σ [1/i].
30 We uniformly replace their notation with our own.
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due to quantifiers], what is needed is what we’ve called the family of meanings
of γ relative to σ…(Glanzberg and King 2020: 17)
So in order to predict the type adjusted meaning on the basis of the expression
meaning—which is required for keeping their theory “compositionally kosher”—
Glanzberg and King posit a notion of expression meaning which is determined by a
family of meaning assignments. In particular, for each index α, there will be a mean-
ing assignment to γ returning λi .γ σ [α/i]. Two expressions γ andψ are synonymous
relative to σ , when the meaning assignment for γ and ψ at σ agree relative to any
index α.
On this approach the overall meaning assigned to an expression is given by its
family of meanings. Two expressions agree in meaning at an assignment when they
determine the same function from numerical indices to type adjusted meanings. Since
the meaning assignments to (11) and (12) will differ for some choices of α, they have
different families ofmeanings relative to σ . So they are not synonymous in the relevant
sense. As a result, Glanzberg and King should not be seen as expanding the standard
diet of options. Rather, they deny synonymy in response to the apparent failure of
compositionality.
Given this they seem to be abandoning their preferred picture whereby sentential
meaning is identified with the objects of assertion and belief. The total semantic
value of a sentence (relative to an assignment) is not a proposition. A sentence has
a family of meaning values—a family of type adjusted meanings—that are appealed
to do the compositional work. Thus, the semantic value assigned to a sentence is
given by its family of meanings. And two sentences agree in semantic value when
they have the same family of meanings—that is, two sentences agree in semantic
value when they determine the same function from linguistic environments to “type
adjusted meanings”. Thus, the semantic value of a sentence (relative to an assignment)
is not a proposition, instead it is a collection of occurrence meanings where one of
thosemeanings is a proposition. So their view rejects the classical picture: the semantic
values of sentence types are not propositional.31
4 Conclusion
We have argued that it is a myth that Frege-inspired occurrence-based semantics
affords a genuine alternative strategy to the standard expression-based semantics.
Occurrence-based approaches fall squarely into the standard general strategies for
resolving compositionality failures.
When Frege’s remarks are construed in terms of the method of direct discourse, we
argued that it amounts to positing ambiguity when faced with an apparent violation
of compositionality. Thus it clearly collapses into the standard deny substitution
option. If instead the Fregean doctrine of “reference shift” is construed in terms of the
method of indirect discourse as positing more sophisticated semantic rules, we argued
that it amounts to enriching the semantic values. While this method has the virtues
31 See Stanley (1997), Ninan (2010), Yalcin (2014), and Rabern (2012, 2017) for discussion of the alter-
native picture which has roots in Dummett (1973), Evans (1979), and Lewis (1980).
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of systematicity and the avoidance of brute ambiguities, we argued that is ultimately
collapses into the other standard option: deny synonymy.
Our two case studies, Pagin and Westerståhl (2010c) on quotation and Salmon
(2006) and Glanzberg and King (2020) on variable binding, support our claim. The
lesson in each case was a general one that would apply to occurrence-based treatments
of any linguistic construction. On the occurrence-based approach (without brute ambi-
guities) a single expression has a diverse family of occurrence meanings—for each
linguistic context ameaning from the family is employed to do the compositionalwork.
We insist that the semantic value of an expression should be understood as the value
assigned to the expression type that accounts for its contribution to truth-conditions
across all the linguistic contexts in which it can occur. Lewis said it well when he said:
To be a semantic value is to be a big enough package of information. A semantic
value worthy of the name must carry all the information that will be needed to
generate other semantic values. Anything that we need to bundle together many
of to get a big enough package is ipso facto not an adequate semantic value.
(Lewis 1986: 44)
Thus,when a semantic theory is construed in an occurrence-basedway the total seman-
tic value assigned to an expression is given by its entire family of occurrencemeanings.
Two expressions agree in semantic value when they have the same family of meanings
(viz. when they determine the same function from linguistic contexts to occurrence
meanings). Thus, positing a difference in occurrence meaning requires a difference in
meaning tout court. The strategy, then, ultimately amounts to enriching semantic val-
ues. Andwhile enriching semantic values in order to avoid failures of compositionality
may be theoretically motivated in many cases, it is, of course, nothing new.
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